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DOING BUSINESS WITH EAST EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES: TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY
Political changes in Eastern Europe have been amazingly fast - with the exception
of Albania these countries have held popular elections; some of them now have former
dissidents and political opposition leaders as presidents.
After the initial excitement with the successful move toward democracy to the East
of Berlin Wall, these ·co.untries face serious problems. The most sobering fact is that,
compared with the fast a·nd dramatic political changes, reconstruction of former socialist
economies will be a long and painful process. More and more obstacles on the road to a
free market economy are encountered each day. Ethnic and social tensions in the region
rise, along with the level of public disappointment:

"

Following the mass euphoria and over-optimistic expectations, the pendulum of the
public opinion in Western countries is now swinging too far in the opposite direction,
taking th~ position that chq,nges in Eastern Europe are too slow, even backward, and no
significant improvement is to be expected soon. Such pessimism is no more warranted than

the unjustified optimism of a year ago.
As usual, the truth is somewhere between the extremes. Most importantly,
developments in the former communist bloc are by and large irreversible. This is not·
simply a result of good will on the part of perestroika inventors and followers, but rather
the only sensible economic strategy for these countries. The limits of the old "socialist
model" have been reached.

THE CHANGE

A MATTER OF SURVIVAL

It would be oversimplified to consider decades of socialism just a tragic error and
economic .disaster. In fact, until the early 1980's central planning and distribution
allowed socialist countries to attain higher growth rates than major developed countries
during their most successful periods (Table J).
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Table 1

Gross National Product growth i'~te 1

Country

Period

USSR
USA

1928-83
1929-84
1855-84
1850-84
1874~84

UK
Germany
Japan

GNP growth
(%)
4.9
3.0
2.1
2.8
4.5

Involving available underutilized resources, concentrating them on large-scale
projects and relying on the mobilization of the population to increase productivity, mo'st
of East European countries have grown up from underdeveloped, primarily agricultural to
moderately industrialized nations, while the USSR. became a superpower. But, despite
rapid economic growth, all these countries remained far behind in per capita income

(Table 2).
Table 2 Pe-r capita income in 19882
Country
Poland
Hungary
USA

Per capita income
$1,850**
$2,460
$19,780

*World Bank esHmates for 1988
Dur-ing the last decade all socialist countries have experienced a decrease in the
rate of economic growth, stagnation and even decline. Undoubtedly, some external
factors have contributed to these problems; but the main reasons were internal, intrinsic
for the model itself:

1source: · Paul A. Samuelson, William D. Nordhaus, Economics (McGraw-Hall, 1985), p. 776.
2source: Economic Report of the President; 1990, p. 226.
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· - Productivity dropped down when people realized that promised "bright future" had

not come closer, especially in comparison with the rest of the world
- New underutilized resources were not as widely available, as they used to be at
earlier stages of economic development
1

-

Relatively isolated trade system of COMECON, with artificial pricing and

mutual exchange of poor quality goods, has left these economies far behind the rest of the
world
- Absence of any real owner in socialist economies led to lack of entrepreneurial
incentive and no real accountability of decision-makers.
Recognizing all these drawbacks of the system, most of the former socialist
countries attempted systemic repair to improve the system, keeping the basic principles
intact. However, this became more difficult after the more radical attempt to introduce

elements of market economy in Czechoslovakia was forcefully ended by the "allied
)

socialist" forces in 1968" - at that time such reform was considered a serious threat for the
socialist bloc.
Similar, but more careful (and not so loud) steps moved forward in Hungary. Joint
ventures with Western partners were legalized in 1972, most of the management and
pricing decisions were decentralized in 1984, foreign ownership was allowed in 1988. In
an attempt to avoid- the embarrassing contradiction with basic principles of communist
ideology, this was called "market socialism". Other East European countries also attempted
some early reforms to improve the socialist economic model. But despite some positive
out<;:omes, the reluctance to allow private property as a normal basis for the free market
economy has kept all these efforts strictly limited within the boundaries of the traditional
socialist model.
Meanwhile, the spread of glasnost (openness) and some relaxation of censorship in
East European countries made possible a wide. public expression of the popular discontent.
The symptoms of the hidden, long repressed disease exploded on the surface in different
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forms of protest. Facing the_ .threat of being swept out unconditionally, most ruling
communist parties started changes themselves, or attempted to gain leading positions in
/
mass popular movements (Romania).
The change in Eastern Europe is a logical consequences of the historic
development, it is inevitable, and the authorities in every country must follo·w this main
line of development if they want to retain their grip on power. There is no other way.
Eastern Europe is a collection of different nations, each of them following its own
reform strategy at its· own pace. The change is not a straightforward process, some
slo_wdowns and even backward movements are possible, but the main perspective is clear
and it is determined: The commitment to democratization and market-oriented economies
is shared throughout the region.

EASTERN EUROPE ON THE ROAD
TO A MARKET ECONOMY

)

The short experience of recent market-oriented reforms in Eastern Europe shows
that the way to a market economy is not an easy freeway .. On the contrary, the road is
relatively unknown, it is to be discovered in the process, by trial and error. So far, no
single country has made the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy.
CREATING BUSINESS INFRASTRUCTURE

Despite significant differences among economists on the necessary concrete steps
and their sequence, creating a normal business infrastructure is considered to be one of'
the highest priorities. This requires establishing

a pr~per legislative basis for business

activities. The changes are fundamental and they begin with the Constitution - private
property and hiring workers, as well as many other basic rights for any business were·
either missing or explicitly defined as a crime in these .former socialist countries.
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Implementing such fundamental legislative changes is not an easy process - both
technically and politically - especially when attempted in combination with the remains
of communist ideology. Simply mentioning private property in a draft for the new
Constitution caused more than half of the legislators to walk out of the Belorussian
parliament last year. The negative image of entrepreneurs and any private initiative,
deliberately created for decades, cannot be deleted overnight. In fact, this image is alive
and well. It is exploited form time to time by conservatives associating entrepreneurship
with the black market to frighten the public.
Creating normal market structures as a substitute for the collapsed centralized
distribution system is also a difficult task, especially in the Soviet Union. Inconsistency
and delay of steps for creation of the market (monetary reform, liberalization of prices,
inflation control, etc.) can undermine the whole process, creating public discontent, as
well as social and political tension.
The banking system in all socialist countries used to be a government monopoly

and was one of the means of centralized control of the economy, even after enterprises
were proclaimed independent. Creation of proper commercial banking structures is now
under way in Eastern Europe, and this is a promising area for Western investments and
expertise.
Transportation and communication facilities in Eastern Europe need significant

improvement. Everybody involved in business with these countries should be aware of
this fact. Even some basic services taken for granted by Western companies are either not
available or are of inferior quality. But this is also an area of recogntzed opportunities
for investment: Canadian Northern Telecom will provide a digital switching telephone
network in Hungary, AT&T will help to improve telecommunications in Poland and
USSR.
Other business-related services, such as legal, consulting and accounting, etc. also
need to be developed and many Western companies are already involved in that process.
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SOCIAL PROBLEMS

On the way to a market economy, East European countries are also facing serious
sodal problems. After decades of socialism, people get used to free education, health
care, pensions, ~tc., and are reluctant to lose these social benefits.
Introducing a market economy will raise prices to their world market level, after
cutting down government subsidies. Living standards will inevitably dfcline during the
first years of reforms. This will be most harmful for low and fixed income groups.
Economic reforms will also bring real, as opposed to hidden, unemployment into East
European economies. Creating an adequate safety-net of social security and benefits is
extremely important. The economic reform in Poland, considered by most experts to be
successful, has increased unemployment to about 6%. Although si_milar levels are found in
the USA, in Poland this creates a substantial public discontent.
PRIVATIZATION OF THE ECONOMY

The experience of over 20 years of attempted reforms in Eastern Europe shows
that the only way to get someone really involved and exercising ownership functions is to
put companies in the hands of real owners -- those whose own fortunes are tied to the
company's performance and success (or failure!).
The. question now is not whether to privatize (all serious economists and most
political leaders are already- convinced!) but how to do it in practice. To privatize means
tha_t many state enterprises will be looking for new owners.
But who are the owners now? This only seems to be an easy question. On the one
hand, the basic communist principle is that the economy is a "property of the whole nation".
Any member of society .has contributed to this property and can claim a fair share of it.
On the other hand, in many cases previous owners of nationalized companies have started
to appear -- like the famous shoe manufacturer Thomas Bata in Czechoslovakia and many
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others in former East Germany. ,The Parliament in Czechoslovakia has already approved
a restitution bill to return much of over $10 billion worth of property nationalized after
1948 to its previous owners.
The situation with farm land is even more complicated. In the Soviet Union all
lands have been nationalized and are, like everything else, the "nation's property". But in
other countries, including Bulgaria, land has never been nationalized. Initially, farmers
contributed their land and other production assets to collective farms, formally retaining
their property rights. After decades of reforms and integration of these farms, now many
people still hold their titles for land which is nonexistent or difficult to' find. Solving
these legal and technical puzzles will not be easy.
In order to p,rovide proper protection against corruption and abuse during the
process of privatization, most East European countries have established special
government agencies for managing government property and privatization.
But let us see who are the potential buyers? After decades of paying workers only
part of their earnings, retaining the rest for centralized investments, personal savings
cannot be considered a substantial investment potential. In fact, these are primarily
"forced" savings for future purchases of unavailable consumer goods, not a real savings
for investment purposes. There are some exotic exceptions - affluent sport stars, actors,
writers, artists, etc. 3 - but they cannot change substantially the whol~ balance.
Other potential sources are "dirty money" from the black market and corruption -for that reason in most countries any substantial investor must provide legal proof of the
source of investment funds.
In practice, all these "domestic" sources combined cannot provide enough pent-up
demand for privatization. Different Employee Stock Ownership Plans are widely discussed

3Former tennis pro Ilie Nastase has invested $14 million in the first private bank in
Romania.
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and are likely to be implemented by most East European countries. This may well have a
positive social effect as a form of fair distribution of property.
Transferring company shares to pension funds, educational and municipal
institutions, previously funded by the state budget will have three positive effects: it will
provide reasonable concentration of ownership for efficient management, financial
resources for these institutions and even some reduction of taxes paid by companies for
these purposes.
Finally, all East European countries are eager to attract foreign investors -- not
purely as a financial source, but also to provide a valuable inflow of modern technology
and management expertise.
The next tough question is how to determine the price of an enterprise, built and
operated in the artificial economic environment with government subsidies, planned prices
and no real market either for production or supplies. Any economic evaluation of the
past performance and profitability is unrealiable, and opportunity analysis of possible
future development is extremely difficult as many elements of the economic environment
are transitional and volatile.
After all, the right price should be the one both buyer and seller agree on. But
how they can meet each other? Where is the market?
Among the instruments destroyed by the planned_ economy were capital markets
(stock exchanges, investment banks). Now they are being restored -- the first Stock
exchange in Eastern Europe was opened a year ago in Budapest (Hungary), other countries
are also moving in that direction. But for now, typically no regular forum exists where
buyers and sellers can exchange their bids and asks. And the need to privatize is now!
So, private placements, buyouts, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and state auctions are
likely to be the main means of privatization in the early 1990s. These are good
opportunities for American investors.
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OPENING DOORS TO THE WEST
Offering enterprises for sale is just one aspect of the "open door" policy. The key
problem is how to Il_lake these offers attractive. But let us see first why most East
European countries are so eager to attract foreign investors. Two complementary sets of
.

.

goals can be rec·ognized at the macroeconomic (governmental) and microeconomic
(commercial) level.
Governments want to satisfy urgent domestic needs for production supplies, health
care and consumer products. Attracting advanced technology, equipment and management
expertise, as well as additional material and financial resources is crucial for
restructuring of the national economy. Expanding export-oriented production capacity is
also a major consideration.
At company management level a joint-venture with a foreign partner is a way to
obtain independence from the parent company or government. Attracting direct
investments and creating export-oriented production facilities as a stable source for
. future development reduces dependenc~ on government subsidies and hard currency
grants and loans. The domestic company can also benefit from the foreign partner's
assets: reputation, established markets for production, management and technology knowhow.
In qrder to attract foreign investors, most East European countries have
undertaken significant steps to create legal basis for doing business and to regularize
foreign investment and ownership.
Previously state controlled foreign trade and investments are now being
decentralized and direct contacts between partners (without government intermediaries)
are allowed. Favorable regulations for profit repatriation and reduced tax rates are also
substantial factors. 4
4 1n Bulg~ria the corporate tax rate for joint ventures with foreign partners is 30%, while
the usual ·rate for domestic c·ompanies is 50%.
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The most attractive areas for Western companies include:
- Communications and transportation infrastructure
- Environment protection equipment
- Health care products, equipment and technologies
- Construction technology and equipment
- Consumer goods production (esp. food processing and packaging)
- Computer hardware and software 5
- Business-related infrastructure and services
- Tourism-related infrastructure and equipment.
'These industries have substantial growth potential, and some of them are critical·
for the reconstruction of East European economies.
Western nations are also supportive of moves towards democracy and market
economy in the former communist bloc. Some East European countries have already
joined international financial structures like the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank and are getting their first loans, others are awaiting approval of their applications.
A special multilaterai project -- European Bank for Reconstruction and Development -- is
designed to assist Eastern Europe in the transition to .the marke( economy. Western
governments have lifted many restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe, granting Most
Favored Nation status and extending various assistance programs and preferential
treatmen,t to most countries in the region.

BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE
East European countries desperately need Western help to reconstruct their
economies, and international organizations and governments to adopt special programs to

5The Soviet Union alone has an estimated total demand for 20 million personal computers
within the next decade.
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support them. However, it is wrong to assume that this is primarily a kind of charitable
activity. Political support, relaxation of restrictions and favorable treatment can create a
hospitable environment. But for Western businesses to come, something else is essential:
competitive advantages.
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

First of all, East European countries and USSR are a huge market, With a total
population of 370 million people, it is a larger market than the ·European Community (325
million). And, unlike the EC, this market is anything but saturated. With common
shortages of virtually all products -- from basic consumer goods to sophisticated high
technology -- there is a substantial unmatched demand for imports.
East European countries are also very attractive low-cost manufacturing sites, with
an additional specific advantage: location. As the year 1992 comes closer, the last is
getting more and more important. Eastern Europe has a potential to become an important
foothold of U.S. companies adjacent to the United Europe in the West and to the huge
·untapped Soviet market to the East.
FORMS OF BUSINESS OPERA TIO NS
Export to .East European countries is the most simple and easy form of business

activity for most Western companies in the beginning. It allows a company to start small,
get fast results and explore expanding market opportunities. This is also a low risk and
low cost approach, especially in commission agreements, where exporter bears no fixed
costs at all, paying only a percent of sales to local agents. Export opportunities exist in
virtually every area, and high-tech industries are expected to be very successful. For
example, it is estimated that East European countries will invest $15 billion in upgrading
their communications networks. The World Bank, the new European Bank for
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Reconstruction and Development, and the European Community all have declared
telecommunications a top priority.6
Exporting to East European countries requires adaptation of products to local
market requirements (standards, documentation) and other adjustments, which increase
with complexity of the product. High-tech equipment also requires service and
maintenance facilities close to the customer. Usually, a local agent or partner is used to
assist with both the technical and bureaucratic aspects of the deal.
The most difficult part of export activities in Eastern Europe is the payment.
Countdes in the region are heavily indebted and direct payment in hard currency is
- difficult to secure. As a rule, it is possible only for high-priority supplies (food, health
care products and equipment) purchased unde_r direct government supervision. For the
majority of exports, Western companies and their local agents must get involved in
currency switching, countertrade or other additionai operations, which sometimes
complicate the main deal beyond acceptable limits in time and expense.
A popular form of business activity in Eastern Europe is licensing --transfer of
technology and know-how to a local partner. The Western Company is not directly
involved in production, no investment is exposed to risks in the region and the lic~nce
agreement provides a stable flow of royalty payments, relatively independent from a real
outcome of the venture. The negative side of such agreements is relatively low profits
and the risk for company's prestige and trademark in case of inferior quality product
manufactured by the licensee.
Overseas production is the most advanced form of business involvement abroad,

with potential for good long-term return on investment, but also with higher risk in the
changing business environment in Eastern Europe. Producing locally can utilize many of

6 source: International Management (UK) (Europe Edition), Vol: 45, Iss: 9, October 1990, pp.
62-64.
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specific advantages in the region. The relatively cheap and well qualifie·d labor force 7 is
one of the first considerations, especially for labor-intensive production. Many West
European companies afready have a iong tradition of using this advantage in clothing,
shoe and other light industries.
In extreme cases all the equipment and materials are imported, but usually local
. resources can be used. In fact, the most promising opportunities for Western investors are
in the areas where a combination of local resources with imported technology and knowhow can deliver a competitive product.
A production site close to the market allows flexibili'ty and fast response to
I

changing requirements, which is difficult to obtain when the product is being made
thousands of miles away. And as the year 1992 comes closer, having a production facility
close to the biggest market in the world -- United Europe -- for many American
companies is a much more important consideration than bleak expectations of profits
during first years.
In many cases, Western investors can benefit from existing production capacity
already in place. Improved by better technology, these facilities can start producing
competitive products in a relatively short time. One such widely publicized deal .is with
Hungarian lighting equipment manufacturer Tungsram, where General Electric has invested
$150 million for the controlling stake in this previously state-owned company. The target
10% of the European market.
Compared with other forms of operations, joint ventures provide subst~ntial
advantages, but they are also a serious long-term financial and commercial commitment in
the region with relatively higher risk. Such a commitment requires precise economic
analysis, careful selection of the partner and, last but not least, patience -- it usually takes
several years to get the first profits from investment in overseas production.
7The average wage rate of a skilied worker in Eastern Europe is estimated to be 5 to 10
times less than in the USA.
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No single form of business operations can be perfect for all situations. In fact,
most Western companies use some combination of them. Exporting is the easiest activity
to start with, giving immediate profit and exploring market opportunities. Licensing is
often used along with other forms to secure a stable flow of royalty payments from the
very beginning of the deal, before such overseas production is capable of generating
substantial profits.
EAST EUROPEAN SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS

Dealing with Eastern Europe is- quite different from usual international business
with other developed countries. Most of the specific difficulties result from
underdeveloped financial systems, restricting the variety of techniques available and
often requiring an innovative approach.
Local currency inconvertibility is the major problem for any business with East

European countries. Direct payment in hard currency is almost impossible to arra_nge,
with a few exceptions for some high-priority areas like baby food or health care products
and supplies. In most cases, however, efforts to get final payment in hard currency
become an important part of the deal itself. Several techniques can be used:
Countertrade is one popular way to avoid currency problems, which has been ·used
for years. Basically, the idea is a return back-in ages to the natural exchange.
Advantages: total independence from any currency volatility, simple and reliable. The
problem is to find appropriate local product for countertrade. One widely publicized
example is the exchange of PEPSI concentrate for Stolichnaya vodka from USSR.
Unfortunately, East European countries do not have many competitive domestic products
to match increasing demand for imported materials and equipment. Scarcity of virtually
everything in some countries and tightening government control over exports makes
co~ntertrade an increasingly difficult method to use in most cases.
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Currency switching is similar to countertrade, but instead of goods, partners
exchange directly different currencies.- The natural base for these operations is the
substantial difference between official and real exchange rates. 8 To start any busine.ss in,
say, the Soviet Union, a Western company must cover from the very beginning its local
expenses (rents, wages and salaries, supplies, etc.) before it has generated enough local
revenue. The straightforward way is to exchange hard currency at state-controlled
official exchange rate, which is unacceptably low.- If another Western company is already
doing successful business there and ha~ the opposite problem -- how to convert local
currency revenues into hard currency, both companies can solve their problems,
exchanging currencies directly at a mutually acceptable rate. This is only a simplified
outline, act~al procedures are more complicated and very often on the fringe of legality.
Countertrade and currency switching are the few techniques used_ to avoid
inconvertibility problems in simple export operations. Some additional opportunities are
related to local producing, when at least part of expenses are paid in local currency and,
instead of searching for an appropriate produce for export, it can be produced. Buyback
agreements include obligation by a Western partner to accept part of the production as a
payment from a joint venture. This approach is usually favored by East European
authorities as a way to supply necessary goods for the local market.
Instead of trying to convert profit into hard currency, another widely used
approach is to invest locally. Sometimes investing is used simply as a temporary storage
for profit, waiting for better opportunity to convert it into hard currency in the future.
But investing locally has some additional advantages. Currently in East European
countries virtually everything is underpriced. Opening the economy will inevitably raise
prices to the world-wide level, and local investors will gain from reevaluat_ion of assets.

81n the USSR the black market exchange rate is over 20 Roubles for $1, while the official
rate is Rbl 1.68/$1 and so-called "visitor rate" is about Rbl 6/$1.
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Some restrictions apply to acquiring property by foreigners, but many prospective areas
exist (for example, in hotels and tourism-related services). And, of course, profit can be
rei_nvested in the expansion of the primary local business.
Most of East European countries are undertaking (or at least planning) steps
toward convertibility of local currencies as an essential element of market-oriented
reforms. While different groups of experts still argue as to which way to achieve
convertibility, some governments have already taken steps. In December 1989 Poland
introduced "internal convertibility," devaluating Zloty by 50% and allowing unlimited
purchase of hard currency by enterprises to pay for imports. Fixed at Zl 9,500/$1, the
exchange rate was higher than the black market price of the dollar. The Polish National
Bank, backed by $1 billion stabilization fund provided by Western nations, withstood the
initial dollar-buying rush and the local currency was stabilized. Combined with other
elements of a comprehensive market-oriented plan, the currency reform helped the Polish
economy to show the first signs of recovery from its deepest postwar crisis. Some of East
European countries are watching carefully this experiment and are preparing to
· implement it, while others (like USSR) has suspended even discussion of the issue.
But, sooner or later, local currency convertibility will come to Eastern Europe. For
Western investors it can bring additional advantages: devaluation of local currency makes
overseas production and exporting more p'rofitable (the dollar value of local expenses
decreases, as long as devaluation is greater than inflation rate -- a ratio which any
government will try to maintain).
Taxes and regulations are very important considerations in doing business with .

East European countries. Most of the governments' activity to attract foreign investors is
concentrated in this area. Many countries offer lower tax rates for companies with
foreign ownership, tax holiday during first years of operation and exemptions for some
high-priority industries: In addition, American investors can claim foreign tax credit for·
taxes paid abroad, it they exceed the applicable corporate tax rate in the USA.
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Accounting practices in Eastern Europe differ from those in the United States, and
taxable income is usually higher, due to lower depreciation rates and fewer tax-deductible
expenses allowed.
In Europe, the value-added tax (V.A.T.) is widely used, and it is likely to be
adopted by most East European countries. this system allows governments to
differentiate tax rates between product groups, according to economic strategy
preferences, and favors exports (unlike corporate tax, V.A.T. is returned for exported
goods). But for foreign investors a V.A.T. system has one major drawback: this tax is in

proportion to activity (sales), not to profits (as corporate tax is). Value-added tax should be
paid regardless of the profit (if any). Thus a corporate tax system keeps weak businesses
afloat, automatically reducing their tax burden, while a V.A.T. system helps them to die
faster. This is a very important consideration for new ventures, which usually do not
generate profit during first years of operation.
Regulations regarding foreign business activities differ from country to country,
but the most common are:
- Restriction of foreign ownership to less than 50% (now abandoned in some
countries)
- Intangible assets (know-how, etc.) usually are not valued as a contribution of
foreign investors, only tangible assets are counted .
- Restrictions on repatriation of earnings (In Poland, foreigners can repatdate thetr
share of after-tax prof it after the cost of all hard currency imports is covered. If
the production is sold locally, only 15% of profits can be converted into hard
currency.)
BUSINESS RISKS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Needless to say, although attractive in many aspects, Eastern Europe is a risky
place to do business.
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Besides inconvertibility problems already discussed, a common threat is possibility
of a sudden and substantial local currency devaluation. The use of countertrade
arrangements eliminates currency and the relevant risk. When stable payments (like
royalties) will be made in the future, the common practice is to denominate them in hard
currency, even if they will be paid in local currency, thus eliminating devaluation losses.
any possible effort should be made to reduce holding of local currency, converting it into
inventory, making advance payments for future imports, etc.
\

Labor uncertainty is other major problem in Eastern Europe. Workers are usually

high skilled and well educated, but their discipline, incentive and quality-consciousness
are far from Western standards. Unions can sometimes play a negative role, undermining
economic reforms by unacceptable deman.ds for immediate improvement (wage increases,
price controls, etc.). The power of unions in some East European countries allows them to
block any unpopular governni.ent action, even when it is the only way out of the economic
crisis.
Social and political risks must also be acknowledged. The hard times are still

ahead for East European countries. Restructuring of the economy will be a painful
process, especially in the beginning and for some groups of population. Demolishjng the
old centralized system with still no proper mark~t environment to replace it causes serious
problems -- the situation in the Soviet Union is an impressive example. The lack of
. noticea~le improvement in living conditions can slow down reforms and even provoke
retreat (martial law, conservative overturn, etc.), based on popular discontent. The key
problem for any East European coun~ry is to get the nation behind the government efforts
and supportive of market-oriented reforms, considering inevitable hardships as a·
contribution for a .better future. It is not easy, but is still possible.
Besides careful evaluation of risks before going into business, insurance can also be
used to deal with uncertainty. For example, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
has already extended its activities to cover East European countries and now offers
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political risk insurance (against currency inconvertibility., expropriation and political

violence), project financing and information services for investors.
(

.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Eastern Europe is a region with unfolding business opportunities. Attractive in
many aspects, it is still a difficult and risky place to deal with, and some recent
developments have raised fears that dangerous backlash and retreat from reforms are
. possible. But as a general line of development, the commitment to democratization and
market-oriented economy is irreversible. Conservative for~es ca·n delay the process, make

it more difficulty ~nd painful, but they cannot stop it. ;rhe year 1991 has very little in
common with 1968 or 1956.
Doing business with East European countries is not easy. It requires a long-term
commitment, patience and careful study of regional specifics. Keeping track of frequent
changes and developments is an extremely difficult part of the work. Many big
companies are already making the scene in Eastern Europe; others are still weighing pros
and cons of going there. But the wait-and-see tactic may lead to losing of opportunities to
more decisive competitors.
Going East is not a kind of charitable activity, it is business, one of many
opportunities to choose _from. Dealing with Eastern Europe requires bigger than usual
portion of courage, but there is a good potential for a substantial reward. For those who
are intimidated by the political turmoil in some parts of the region, it is worth
.

.

remembering, that Armand Hammer star.ted his 70-year successful business with the Soviet
Union in the early twenties. Uncertaint)'. now is in no way greater than during the Civil
War in Russia. He was bullish on the future, and he won.

Ilia Fartounov
Columbia, MO
March 7, 1991

